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1.  Introduction  
 
The choice of exchange rate regime has always been one of the most important subjects in 
international macroeconomics. Since the publication of Robert Mundell’s “A Theory of Optimum 
Currency Area”, we have seen a large amount of literature trying to tackle this crucial issue to 
identify how countries choose their exchange rate regimes. According to the theory of optimum 
currency areas, this choice is made on the basis of some structural and macroeconomic factors 
such as the size, the degree of openness or the level of economic development of a particular 
country. Another set of literature emphasizes political and institutional factors such as political 
instability, central bank independence or the government temptation to inflate as important criteria 
influencing the choice of exchange rate regime. In this case, the choice between pegged and 
flexible exchange rate regimes becomes a pure political decision that depends on the degree of 
credibility of policy makers. For instance, by adopting a credible peg, a country’s inflationary bias 
would theoretically converge to the relatively lower bias of the stable reserve-currency country and 
thus a possible credibility gain would be realized. Finally, following the numerous currency crises 
that shook the international monetary system in the mid-nineties, several researchers have 
suggested that the choice of an exchange rate regime is mainly determined by the level of financial 
integration and the degree of capital account openness of a country.  
 
In a previous work
1, we investigated the determinants of exchange rate regimes choice in 17 
MENA countries for the 1990-2000 period and found that these countries chose their regimes on 
the basis of two main structural and macroeconomic factors, namely their degree of economic 
development and the level of their international reserves. In this paper, we also limit our 
discussions to empirical aspects related to the determinants of exchange rate regime choice in the 
MENA countries. We extend our previous work in three different manners. First, we consider in 
our analysis only potential structural and macroeconomic determinants of exchange rate regime 
choice since it has been shown in our previous study that other modern theories such as the 
political view or the capital account openness approach could not adequately explain the choice of 
exchange rate regime by the MENA countries. Second, we estimate several ordered multinomial 
Probit models for an unbalanced panel of 15 MENA countries between 1977 and 2007 and use 
three different de jure and de facto classifications in order to capture more adequately the choice of 
exchange regimes by these countries.
2 Our reason for choosing 1977 as the starting date is 
unavailability of data for earlier years. Finally, we supplement our analysis by computing marginal 
effects as opposed to simple coefficients since we are interested in analyzing the change in the 
probability of the different exchange rate regimes in response to changes in the explanatory 
variables. Our empirical results indicate that the de jure regimes describe better the exchange rate 
strategies implemented in the MENA countries than the de facto specifications. Furthermore, we 
find that among the theoretical long-run determinants proposed by the optimum currency area 
theory, the level of international reserves seem to adequately determine the choice of exchange rate 
regime of the MENA countries. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the second section we describe the 
evolution of exchange rate strategies in the MENA countries. In section 3, we briefly review the 
main hypothesis and predictions concerning the choice of an exchange regime as advanced by the 
                                                 
1 Sfia, M.D (2007) “The choice of exchange rate regimes in the MENA countries: a Probit Analysis” The William 
Davidson Institute WP N°899. 
2 The country list is: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen   3
optimum currency theory. In Section 4, we present the data, methodology and the results of our 
estimations. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Evolution of exchange rate regimes in the MENA countries 
 
Initially, we begin by discussing the main rationales for using de jure and de facto exchange rate 
regime classifications. Then, we describe the evolution of regimes in the countries considered in 
our analysis based on these two categories 
 
  2.1 A Word on exchange rate regime classification  
 
For many years (since the early 1950’s) the International Monetary Fund (IMF) used de jure 
classifications to describe the shares of fixed versus floating arrangements among its member 
countries. Although comprehensive in terms of country and historical coverage, this de jure 
classification system had a serious drawback, in practice, exchange rate regimes often differed 
from what they were officially announced to be. Indeed, many countries that in theory have a 
flexible rate intervene in exchange markets so pervasively that in practice very little difference 
exists with countries that have explicit fixed exchange rate regimes. Also, several countries that 
declare fixed exchange rates undertake periodic and frequent devaluations that it becomes difficult 
to differentiate the peg from a managed float regime. For many years and until the late 1990’s, 
most empirical studies of exchange rate regime relied on the de jure regime classification reported 
in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
Consequently, these empirical analyses risked reaching completely false conclusions and drawing 
misleading policy implication. Recognizing the merits of classifying regimes more realistically, the 
IMF switched in 1999 to a mixed (hybrid) de jure-de facto classification. This new classification 
combines the information obtained from specific countries about their exchange rate regime and 
monetary policy framework with the analysis of the variance of exchange rates, interest rates and 
official reserves. Despite the considerable progress made by the IMF’s de facto classification, it 
remained relatively limited from an empirical angle since it offers a short historical data base.  
 
With the view to addressing this shortcoming, several researchers have tried to generate their own 
de facto classifications. Among these, the classifications of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (LYS) ( 
2005) and Reinhart and Rogoff’s (RR) (2002) are considered as the most important and are the 
most frequently used in the empirical research on exchange rate regimes today.
3 Unlike the IMF’s 
de jure classification, The LYS classification ignored completely the declarations of countries 
about their exchange rate and monetary practices to focus only on describing the de facto practices 
by analysing the volatility of the exchange rate and of the official reserves. According to LYS, 
Floats will be characterised by high variance in the exchange rate and low variance in official 
reserves while pegged regimes will display low exchange rate variance and large swings in 
reserves. The authors resorted to the cluster analysis technique to classify exchange regimes into 
five distinct categories; flexible, dirty float, crawling peg, fixed and inconclusive. The cluster 
analysis that was applied to all IMF reporting countries over the period 1974-2000 was made in 
two rounds. After the first round, only 1062 among 2860 observations were classified, the 
remaining 1798 observations were submitted to the same procedure to reduce the number of 
inconclusive observations. The second round procedure reclassified 1100 observations. The 
remaining 698 (24%) observations were finally included in the “inconclusive group”. This is 
considered as the main drawback of the LYS classification. The Reinhart and Rogoff’s 
                                                 
3 See also Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002).  
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classification adopted a broadly similar nomenclature to that of the IMF’s de facto classification. 
However, the authors relied on monthly database of exchange regimes for 153 countries over the 
period 1946-2002, computed a variety of descriptive statistics and distinguished between countries 
which have a unified exchange market and those where there are multiple exchange rates. The 
“Natural” classification generated by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) divides exchange regimes into 
five categories; fixed, limited flexibility, managed floating, freely floating, and freely falling.
4  
 
To summarize, we can say that exchange rate classifications can be grouped into three different 
categories. The first is a pure de jure classification based exclusively on the country’s self 
description of its regime. The second type of classifications can be described as “hybrid” since it 
combines the self declared regime by one country with information obtained from analysis of 
statistical data and some specific time series. Finally, the third category of exchange regime 
classification is a pure de facto classification where the self-described regimes are totally ignored 
by the researchers and where the assignment of countries into fixed, intermediate or floating 
regime is based solely on the behaviour or variability of exchange rates, international reserves and 
interest rates. 
 
  2.2 Evolution of exchange rate regimes in the MENA countries  
 
In order to characterize the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the 15 MENA countries 
considered, we need to classify these regimes into categories. As in most empirical works, we 
classify both the de jure (IMF) and the de facto (LYS and RR) exchange rate regimes into three 
principal categories; namely a peg, an intermediate regime and a float. In table 1, 2 and 3, we 
report the percentages of country observations that fall into these three categories for de jure and 
the de facto exchange rate regimes in MENA countries during the whole period as well as during 
three sample periods i.e. 1977 to 1985, 1986 to 1995 and 1996 to 2007 for the IMF’s de jure 
classification, 1996 to 2000 for the LYS classification and 1996 to 2001 for the RR classification. 
 
 







1977- 2007  67.31  5.81  26.88 
1977- 1985  88.89  2.96  8.15 
1986- 1995  62.00  8.00  30.00 
1996- 2007  58.19  6.21  35.59 
Notes: (1) The Category denoted Peg comprises hard and conventional peg arrangements. 
 (2) The Category denoted intermediary comprises all pegged exchange rates within margins. 
 (3) The Category denoted float comprises managed floating and independently floating regimes. 
Source: IMF (Various issues). 
 







1977- 2000  51.53  33.15  15.32 
1977- 1985  62.22  31.85  5.93 
1986- 1995  46.67  36.00  17.33 
1996- 2000  41.89  29.73  28.38 
Notes: (1) The Category denoted Peg comprises fixed arrangements. 
 (2) The Category denoted intermediary comprises intermediary and basket arrangements 
 (3) The Category denoted float comprises floating regimes. 
Source: Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
 
                                                 
4 Countries whose twelve-month rate of inflation is above 40 percent.   5
 







1977- 2001  10.93  76.80  12.27 
1977- 1985  16.30  70.37  13.33 
1986- 1995  4.67  80.67  14.67 
1996- 2001  13.33  80.00  6.67 
Notes: (1) The Category denoted Peg comprises hard and conventional peg arrangements. 
 (2) The Category denoted intermediary comprises all pegged exchange rates within margins. 
 (3) The Category denoted float comprises managed floating and independently floating regimes. 
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) 
 
Table 1 shows the evolution of the three aggregated exchange rate regimes categories over the 
three periods considered based on the IMF’s de jure classification. We can easily see that despite a 
marked decline in their share, pegged exchange rate regimes remained the more dominant type of 
monetary arrangement among the MENA countries. Over the last decade (1996-2007), more than 
58 percent of the MENA countries were still pursuing various forms of pegged arrangement 
compared with 88 percent during the early eighties (1977-1985). This drop in pegged exchange 
rate regimes is accompanied with a slight increase in the proportion of intermediate regimes from 
nearly 3 percent to almost 7 percent. Finally, the share of floats has increased significantly from 
8.15 percent during the 1977-1985 to nearly 36 percent at the end of the sample period. Thus, the 
evolution of the de jure exchange rates regimes brings out one clear conclusion; there is a 
discernible trend toward increased flexibility among the MENA countries over the last 30 years. 
However, the revealed gain in popularity of flexible exchange rate regimes among the MENA 
countries might just be illusory since the results are based on these countries self-declarations to 
the IMF. Hence, the trend toward flexibility might be a simple reflection of the “flexibilist” ideas 
promoted by the IMF i.e. MENA countries describe themselves as floaters because that is what the 
IMF wants to hear, but in reality they intervene massively to adjust their exchange rates. Thus, we 
can define their attitude as “fear of the IMF”. 
 
In table 2, we present the proportions of the three categories of exchange rate regimes obtained 
from the LYS classification. As Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) point out, their 
classification and that of the IMF bear several similarities.
5 This is clearly visible in our results 
since the trends in exchange rate regimes choice by the MENA countries described  by the LYS de 
facto classification are almost comparable to those obtained from the de jure classification. While 
the proportion of pegged exchange rate regimes decreased from 62 percent in the first sub-period 
to nearly 42 percent during the last decade and that of floaters increased from 5.93 percent to 28.38 
percent between the two sample periods, the share of intermediate regimes remained relatively 
high and stable around 30 percent.  
 
Finally, table 3 describes the evolution of exchange rate regimes in the MENA countries by 
utilising the RR’s de facto classification. According to this classification the intermediate regimes 
have been and continue to be more prevalent in the MENA countries than suggested by the de jure 
or the LYS classifications. While de jure intermediate regimes accounted for only 5.81 percent of 
all exchange rate regimes, the proportion of de facto regimes with an intermediate degree of 
flexibility account for about 75 percent of all de facto regimes in the RR classification over the 
whole period. Moreover, according to the RR classification, the share of MENA countries with 
                                                 
5 However, the IMF’s (LYS) classification tends to overestimate the share of Flexible (intermediate) exchange rate 
regimes. 
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intermediate regimes has increased significantly from 70 percent in the first sample period to 80 
percent over the 1996-2001 period. Together with the decrease in the proportions of pegged and 
floating exchange rate regimes, this trend toward intermediate regime implies a shift away from 
the two ends spectrum of exchange rate regimes providing strong evidence that intermediary 




Unlike several empirical studies on the evolution of exchange rate regimes in developing 
countries
6, comparison of the results obtained from the IMF’s de jure, the LYS’s and RR’s de 
facto  classifications for the MENA countries suggests that the so-called “middle” along the 
flexibility dimension continues to constitute a significant proportion of all regimes, as it has 
throughout the last past three decades. Thus, our results raise serious questions about the validity 
of the “bipolar” hypothesis in the MENA countries and more generally in developing countries. 
Starting in the mid-1990’s and following the virulent currency crisis in several developing 
countries, some observers had predicted that emerging market economies, would, over time move 
to the polar extremes of exchange rate flexibility, that is they would either adopt freely floating 
regimes or move to hard pegs such as monetary union, currency boards or dollarization.
7 Our 
results, however, rejects this “bipolar” view and provide strong support for another hypothesis; that 
is “the middle has been and will always be viable”, at least for the MENA countries. Our empirical 
findings based on the three classifications can also be qualified by two strong other hypothesis. 
The former, the “fear of floating” hypothesis casts doubts on the view that countries tend to move 
towards more flexible exchange rate arrangements in a context of increasingly unstable 
international markets Calvo and Reinhart (2002). The Latter, the “fear of pegging” stresses the 
increased awareness of speculative attacks, particularly among small open developing economies 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). 
 
 
3.  Structural and macroeconomic determinants of exchange rate regime choices: 
theoretical predictions and empirical findings 
 
Traditionally, explanations of exchange rate choices built on the optimum currency area and 
related approaches. Initially, we present the main structural and macroeconomic factors affecting 
countries probability of choosing an exchange rate regime, and then we review the empirical 
findings concerning these factors. 
 
  3.1 Theoretical predictions on exchange rate choice  
 
The theory of optimum currency area, which originates in Mundell (1961), relates the choice of an 
exchange rate regime to some long-term determinants that are relatively stable over time. This 
approach to the fix vs. float dilemma weights the trade and welfare gains from a stable (fixed) 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the world (or, more precisely, the country’s main trade partners) 
against the benefits of exchange rate flexibility as a shock adjuster in the presence of nominal 
                                                 
6 See for example Fisher (2001) or Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) among others. 
7 Summers (2000, p8) wrote that “the choice of appropriate exchange rate regime, which, for economies with access to 
international capital markets, increasingly means a move away from the middle ground of pegged but adjustable fixed 
exchange rates towards the two corner regimes of either flexible exchange rates or a fixed exchange rate supported, if 
necessary, by a commitment to give up altogether an independent monetary policy.” 
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rigidities. According to the “traditional” arguments of the theory of optimum currency area, only 
sizable countries characterised with structural diversification of their economies, as well as with 
geographical diversification of their exports and imports, can afford floating exchange rates for 
their currencies. In consequence, country characteristics such as small size, high openness to trade, 
and high concentration of trade with a particular partner are more likely to be associated with fixed 
exchange rate regimes, Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963), Kenen (1969).  The “traditional” 
optimum currency area theory also stipulates that macroeconomic factors such as the inflation 
differential of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world, the level of economic development and the 
degree of capital mobility may influence the choice of an exchange rate regime system. A higher 
divergence of a country’s inflation to that of its main trading partners would necessitate frequent 
exchange rate adjustments. As such, similarity of inflation rates would favour a pegged exchange 
rate regime, Fleming (1973). Regarding the degree of economic development, we would generally 
expect that the lower it is, the less developed and efficient would be both the goods market and the 
factor market and consequently the less suitable is a fixed exchange rate regime, Holden, Holden 
and Suss (1979). Finally, concerning the degree of capital mobility, it is argued that under fixed 
exchange rates, international capital movements may frustrate the objectives of monetary policy. 
In contrast, flexible exchange rates may provide a certain degree of monetary independence of a 
country. Hence, a high degree of capital mobility would likely to be associated with floating 
exchange rates, Savvides (1990).
8 
 
Generally, the empirical facts tend to provide strong support for the optimum currency area theory 
predictions i.e. economies that have high trade openness ratio will opt for fixed exchange rate 
regimes and advanced and financially integrated countries will have flexible exchange 
arrangements. Indeed, it is broadly recognised that governments of countries that trade intensively, 
such as China, have tended to intervene a lot to stabilise the exchange rate of their currencies and 
thus to have less flexible exchange rate regimes. At the same time, industrialised and advanced 
economies with low external trade ratios such as the United States, Japan or Australia, with large 
access for international capital markets, have tended to choose flexible exchange rate regimes. 
However, where we can easily identify a similar pattern for industrialised and less developed 
economies, it is by far more difficult to detect a clear pattern for emerging markets. 
 
  3.2 Empirical findings on factors affecting exchange rate regime choice  
 
Since the work by Dreyer (1978), Heller (1978) or Holden, Holden and Suss (1979), several 
empirical studies have been dedicated to the question of exchange rate regime.
9 All these studies 
looked at structural and macroeconomic factors as potential determinants of the exchange rate 
regime choice.  
 
Dreyer (1978) is among the first studies of this kind who analysed the determinants of exchange 
rate regimes with data for 88 developing countries for the year 1976. He relies in his estimates on 
explanatory variables that are exclusively related to optimum currency theory (size of the 
economy, openness, geographical and structural diversification) and estimates an ordinal Probit 
model. His results show that the optimum currency area theory is strongly confirmed; larger 
countries would tend to opt for higher degree of flexibility while a higher degree of geographical 
and structural diversification strengthens the tendency toward greater fixity of an exchange regime. 
Heller’s analysis is different from Dreyer’s in several ways. He carries out a cross-section analysis 
involving 85 advanced and developing countries and uses a non parametric statistical technique 
                                                 
8 See Table A.1 for more details on Predictions concerning the choice of exchange rate regimes 
9 See Juhn and Mauro (2002).   8
(Discriminant analysis) to show that a large size, a small foreign trade sector, a high degree of 
financial integration, a large inflation differential in comparison to the world average and a 
diversified foreign trade pattern tend to be associated with floaters. While these two studies rely in 
their analysis on IMF’s official de jure classification, Holden, Holden and Suss (1979) choose to 
measure the degree of flexibility of one country’s exchange rate regime by computing an exchange 
rate flexibility index.
10 They estimate a linear equation using ordinary least squares where the 
flexibility index is the dependent variable and six explanatory variables (openness, capital 
mobility, external sector’s diversification, geographical concentration of trade, degree of economic 
development and inflation differential) on a cross-sectional data for 75 countries. Their results also 
provide empirical support for the OCA theory. Following these three main contributions, several 
other empirical works have tried to analyse the choice of exchange rate regime using many of the 
optimum currency area variables meanwhile as to assess other newer theories such as the political 
economy view, the fear of floating hypothesis or the bipolar view. Since a detailed review of these 
empirical works including an explanation of their methodological differences or similarities is 
beyond the scope of this paper, suffice is to say that the majority of these studies provide large 
support for the optimum currency area theory suggesting that individual structural and 
macroeconomic factors could have exercised an influence on the choice of exchange rate regime.
11 
 
4.  Data, variables definitions and estimations results  
 
Our analysis of the potential determinants of exchange rate regimes choices involve many of the 
explanatory variables that have been suggested by theory and used in previous empirical studies. 
Detailed definitions and data sources are given in Appendix (table A.3).  
 
  4.1 Data and variable definitions 
 
For our empirical analysis, we concentrate on the exchange rate regimes adopted by 15 MENA 
countries after the break down of the Bretton Woods system i.e. during the 1977-2007 period.
12 
Unless indicated otherwise, The World Bank Development indicators (WDI) database is the main 
source for the independent variables. The structural and macroeconomic potential determinants of 
exchange rate regimes we include in our analysis are the following: 
 
Optimum Currency area variables 
 
•   Economic Size: GDP in U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity (PPP). 
•   Level of economic development: GDP per capita in U.S. dollars at PPP. 
•  Degree of Openness: ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. 
•  Geographical concentration of trade:  Share of trade with the largest trading partner: exports to 
the largest trading partner as a share of total exports, from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics. 
• Inflation Differential: difference between inflation in the country and inflation in the USA.  
•   Degree of capital mobility: ratio of Gross private capital flows to GDP. 
 
                                                 
10 The index of exchange rate flexibility of a country is measured by the ratio of the sum of the absolute value of 
monthly percentage changes in the trade-weighted exchange rate to the sum of the absolute changes in official 
holdings of foreign exchange expressed in US dollars divides by the sum of imports plus exports. See Holden, Holden 
and Suss (1979) for more details. 
11 See Table A.2 for more details. 
12 Estimations using the LYS and the RR de facto classifications are for the periods 1977-2000 and 1977-2001, 




•   International reserves: Total reserves in months of imports. 
•   Current account: ratio of current account balance to GDP. 
•  Growth:  GDP growth (annual %). 
•   Domestic credit:  ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP. 
 
Data for the dependent variable, exchange rate regime, are collected from the IMF’s Exchange 
Rate Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions Annual Reports, as well as from the papers LYS 
(2005) and RR (2002). Previous studies used various methods and techniques to measure the 
variable “exchange rate regime”. These range from discriminant analysis, Heller (1978), flexibility 
index and Ordinary Least Squares, Holden, Holden and Suss (1979), Poirson (2001) to Probit and 
Logit models with discrete qualitative choice variables. The latter consist of the following 
categories: two regimes with fixed and flexible rates, Dreyer (1978), Savvides (1990), Bosco 
(1987), three regimes with fixed, intermediate, and float Bosco (1987), Rizzo (1998), Sfia (2007) 
and four or more regimes with single-currency peg, basket peg, crawling peg and float, Melvin 
(1985), Juhn and Mauro (2002). In our analysis, we also describe the choices of exchange rate 
regimes using a discrete variable , it Y . Following our classifications (section 2.2), this variable can 
take one of the following three values: 
 
                  0,     if a fixed exchange rate regime is chosen by country i in year t, 
, it Y =          1,     if country i chooses an intermediate exchange rate regime in year t  
                   2,    if a flexible exchange rate regime is chosen by country i in year t,  
 
  4.2 Estimations results 
 
Before turning to regression analysis, we have to choose the appropriate model that we will 
consider in the rest of our study. In other words, we have to decide whether we must choose a 
Probit or a Logit specification for our regressions.  
 
4.2.1 The baseline model of regime choice 
 
The problem of interest can be described as wanting to estimate the following relation: 
it it it x Y ε β + ′ =




it Y the unobserved dependent variable, xit is is a vector of independent variables,β  is a 
vector of coefficients, N is the number of countries and Ti denotes the number of observations for 
country i. The econometric literature on panel data models suggests employing a specific fixed-
effects model for a particular set of countries. However, it has been shown that the maximum 
likelihood estimator that we use in our estimations is inconsistent in a country-specific fixed 
effects model, Chamberlain (1980). Therefore, we use the random effects model in order to control 
for country-heterogeneity and assume that: 
 
i it it u v + = ε  















Where ui is a country specific random component that is constant across time and ) , 0 ( ~ u i N u σ , vit 
is a normally distributed error term,  ) , 0 ( ~ v i N v σ  and 1 = v σ . Since Yit* is unobserved, what we 
observe in the exchange rate regime analysis is: 
                  0,     if 
*
it Y ≤ 0 µ  
, it Y =          1,     if  0 µ ≤
*
it Y ≤ 1 µ  
                    2,     if  1 µ ≤
*
it Y  
 
More specifically, we assume that a country chooses a fixed exchange rate regime if the dependent 
variable falls below a specific threshold 0 µ . If the dependent variable is between two 
thresholds 0 µ and 1 µ , the country is presumed to choose an intermediate regime. Finally, if the 
dependent variable exceeds 1 µ , the country is assumed to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime.  
 
The probability of each regime being chosen is: 
 
 
Pr ( 0) it ob Y = 0 () it i x u µ β′ = Ψ− − 
Pr ( 1) it ob Y = 10 () () it i it i x ux u µ βµ β ′ ′ = Ψ− −− Ψ− − 
Pr ( 2) it ob Y = 1 1( ) it i x u µ β′ = −Ψ − −  
 
In order to estimate such a model, we have to make some assumptions about the distribution of the 
errors terms i.e. about the form of (.) Ψ . We assume that the error term it ε follows the logistic or 
normal distribution. In the first case we have: 
exp( ' ) 1
(' )















In the Probit model, the cumulative function is given by: 
 
' 1 2
2 ( ' ) (2 ) exp( ) 2
x




−∞ Ψ− = − ∫  
 
Since the two functional forms are very close to each other, the results obtained using one of them 
are likely to be not very different, unless the sample is large and there are many observations on 
the tails, Maddala (1983). Also, because the information criteria of Akaike, Schwartz and Hannan-
Quinn do not indicate a clearly superior model, we assume that the error term it ε  is i.i.d with a 
normal distribution having a mean of zero and variance of one. Logit estimations provide similar 
results so that our choice of a normal distribution does not have excessive influence on analysis.  
 
4.2.2 Estimations results from a multinomial ordered Probit model   
 
In this section we report the empirical evidence concerning the importance of the hypothesis 
emanating from the optimum currency area and macroeconomic theories to the choice of exchange 
rate regimes in the MENA countries. As, stated before, the base specification is estimated with   11
data for 15 MENA countries using both de jure and de facto classifications. We use one period 
lagged series for all the explanatory variables in order to mitigate simultaneity problems which 
would arise from using contemporaneous values for these variables.
13 Before turning to the 
regression analysis, we examine the pairwise matrix of correlation coefficients of the potential 
determinants of exchange rate regimes. The results reported in table A.5 indicate that there is no 
obvious sign of multicollinearity. 
 
Table 4 reports the results of the specification of the de jure exchange rate regimes. The 
determinants of choosing among fixed, intermediate or flexible exchange rate regimes were 
estimated using multinomial ordered Probit analysis.
14 A positive (negative) sign of a coefficient 
means that an increase in the associated variable raises the probability of adopting a floating 
(pegged) exchange rate regime.  
 
Table 4: Determinants of exchange rate regimes, IMF de jure classification 1977-2007 
 Coef.  Z-statistic.  Marginal  effects. 
Variable      
GDP 7.37e-12  -1.1  -- 
Gdpper -0.0001117  -2.47***  -0.0002 
Open -2.000434  -2.07***  -3.89 
Geoc -0.0277578  -1.74**  -0.059 
Infd -0.0459024  -2.91***  -0.076 
CapM 0.0032946  3.43***  0.001 
Res -0.0920198  -2.06***  -0.17 
Cagdp 0.0028287  0.18 -- 
Growth -0.0238367  -0.95  -- 
Credit -0.0076505  -0.67 -- 
Log likelihood  -162.83322    
LRχ
2(9)
a  34.98    
Pseudo-R
2b  0.111    
a  The x
2 value is defined as 2(L1-L0) where L0 is the value of the log-likelihood function containing only the constant term and L1 is the value of the 
log-likelihood function including all explanatory variables. 
b For Probit models, the R
2 statistic is meaningless. Hence, we report an appropriate measure of goodness of fit, i.e. the Pseudo-R
2. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
Although, the variable GDP has the expected sign it has no significant role in the selection of de 
jure exchange rate regimes. However, the variables Open and Geoc have all (expected) meaningful 
economic signs and are statistically significant suggesting that economies that are characterized 
with a high degree of openness as well as with a high concentration of trade would tend to opt for 
fixed exchange rate regimes. Furthermore, the variable CapM has a positive and statistically 
significant sign indicating that countries that are open to capital markets are more willing to float. 
These findings provide strong support for the optimum currency area theory. On the other hand, 
the coefficient characterizing the variable Gdpper (level of development) has a negative sign which 
contradicts the optimum currency area theory. Indeed, our results indicate that an economy is less 
likely to adopt a flexible exchange rate regime if it is more developed. This result is completely in 
line with our previous findings for the MENA countries in Sfia (2007). A possible interpretation 
for this result is that the more an economy is developed, the more it is diversified and the stronger 
the case for fixed exchange rates. Regarding the variable Infd, we find that a large inflation 
                                                 
13 See table A.4 for some descriptive statistics for each of the explanatory variables. 
14 The model is estimated by the log-likelihood function introduced by Butler and Moffitt (1982). The Gauss-Hermite 
quadrature method deals with the random effects structure in the model.   12
differential in comparison to the world average strengthens the tendency toward greater fixity of an 
exchange regime, also a result that contradicts the optimum currency area theory predictions. 
Nevertheless, this result is consistent with the credibility hypothesis which stipulates that a high 
inflation country has much to gain from pegging its currency to the currency of a low inflation 
country or from joining a monetary union.  Finally, concerning the macroeconomic determinants of 
exchange rate regimes, the coefficients of the variables Caddp, Growth and Credit are not significant. 
However, the variable characterizing the level of reserves has a negative and significant sign. This 
result supports the hypothesis that economies characterised with high levels of international 
reserves tend to adopt fixed exchange rate regimes as large reserves can enhance the sustainability 
of such regimes. Table 4 also reports the marginal effects on the probability of choosing a fixed or 
a flexible exchange rate regime.
15 The marginal effects of changes in independent variables 
indicate the increase in the probability of adopting a fixed (flexible) exchange rate regime due to a 
unit-increase in the explanatory variable under consideration. For, example the estimated marginal 
effects of Open reported in the table indicate that an increase in the ratio of total trade to GDP by 
one percent increases the hypothetical country’s probability of adopting a fixed exchange rate 
regime by 3.89 percent and decreases the probability of adopting a floating regime by 3.89 percent.  
 
Table 5 reports the results of the specification of the LYS’s de facto exchange rate regime. We 
note significant differences between the results for the de facto and the de jure categories. These 
results are not surprising given the fact that we observed some discrepancies between the two types 
of classifications. First, the two goodness of fit measures, a LR test statistic distributed as 
2 χ (9) 
for each model, and the pseudo-R
2 suggest that the LYS de facto specification exhibits a lower 
explanatory power than that of the de jure one. We also note that only four variables are 
individually significant in contrast with the de jure model in which six variables are significant. 
Regarding the optimum currency area theory, two out of six coefficients (Gdpper and Open) are 
significant. Moreover, the signs of these coefficients are in line with the predictions of theory, 
namely less developed economies characterised with high degree of openness favour pegged 
exchange rate regimes. From table 5, we also can see that an increase by one percent in the openness 
(level of development) of a country raises the probability of adopting a pegged (flexible) exchange rate 
regime by 3.95 (2.2) percent. However, contrary to the de jure exchange regimes, the variables 
GDP, Geoc, infd and CapM seem to play no significant role in the selection of de facto exchange 
rate arrangements. As in the de jure classification, higher levels of international reserves increase 
the probability of choosing a peg. Finally, we find that the variable Credit is statistically significant 
with a positive sign suggesting that countries that are characterized with high levels of domestic credit 
to the private sector are more likely to choose a flexible exchange rate regime. The variable Credit 
measures the health of the financial system and is generally perceived by market participants as 
positively related to the degree of flexibility since an expansion in bank credits is likely to increase the 
ratio of bad loans to good loans, which leads to speculative attacks on the currency, Sachs, Tornell and 
Velasco (1996).  
 
 
Table 5: Determinants of exchange rate regimes, LYS de facto classification 1977-2000 
 LYS 
1977-2000 
Z-statistic Marginal  effects 
Variable     
GDP -1.57e-12  0.075  -- 
Gdpper 4.58e-08  3.72***  2.2 
Open -2.648875  -3.98***  -3.95 
Geoc -0.001628  -0.17  -- 
                                                 
15 Marginal effects are reported only when the variable is significant.   13
Infd -0.0062561  -0.70  -- 
CapM -0.0073665  -1.19  -- 
Res -0.2477252  -4.60***  -0.35 
Cagdp 0.0579595  4.59 -- 
Growth -0.0160636  -1.00  -- 
Credit 0.0087563  2.03***  0.00028 
Log likelihood  -180.40684    
LRχ
2(9)
a  1.52    
Pseudo-R
2b  0.005    
a  The x
2 value is defined as 2(L1-L0) where L0 is the value of the log-likelihood function containing only the constant term and L1 is the value of the 
log-likelihood function including all explanatory variables. 
b For Probit models, the R
2 statistic is meaningless. Hence, we report an appropriate measure of goodness of fit, i.e. the Pseudo-R
2. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 
*** Significant at 1% level. 
 
Finally, the results obtained using the RR de facto classification are presented in table 6. As in the 
LYS specification, The RR de facto specification presents a lower explanatory power than that of 
the IMF de jure one. Among six optimum currency area variables only half of them are significant. 
More precisely, we find that the level of economic development, the degree of trade concentration 
and the degree of capital mobility increase the probability of adopting flexible exchange rate 
regimes. Marginal effects for these variables indicate that an increase by one percent in Gdpper, 
Geoc and CapM raises the probability of adopting flexible exchange rates respectively by 2.2 
percent, 0.036 percent and 0.0025 percent. Turning to macroeconomic variables, our results show, 
as in the previous estimations, that the variables Res has a negative and significant sign indicating 
that the level of international reserves remains an important determinant of regime choice among 
the MENA countries.
16 We also find that the variable Credit is significant and that its coefficient 
has a negative sign. A result that contradicts the previous one obtained from the LYS 
classification. Finally, the variable Growth is significant and bears a negative sign. This indicates 
that countries with poorer economic performances will tend to prefer more rigid exchange rate 
arrangements. However we expected that higher growth rates would be associated with flexible 
exchange rate regimes since economic recessions can increase the probability of currency crisis 
and encourage the implementation of floating exchange arrangements. According to Edwards 
(1996), our result can be interpreted as providing evidence in favour of the credibility theory and the 
“tying its own hands” hypothesis. In other words, countries that are characterized with low growth 
rates will have great incentives to renege on their low inflation promises and, thus, will benefit 
from adopting a more rigid exchange-rate system.  
 
Table 6: Determinants of exchange rate regimes, RR de facto classification 1977-2001 
 RR 
1977-2001 
Z-statistic Marginal  effects 
Variable     
GDP 8.87e-12  0.165  -- 
Gdpper 2.12e-08  2.19**  2.2 
Open 1.530469  0.898  -- 
Geoc 0.0572406  5.37***  0.036 
Infd -0.0012423  -0.13  -- 
CapM   0.005126  3.86***  0.0025 
Res -0.1044341  -2.49***  -0.186 
Cagdp 0.0041407  3.18 -- 
Growth -0.0468493  -2.89***  -0.078 
Credit -0.0096466  -1.57**  -0.021 
                                                 
16 This results is also consistent with our previous findings in Sfia (2007).   14
Log likelihood  -127.91916    
LRχ
2(9)
a  20.76    
Pseudo-R
2b  0.079    
a  The x
2 value is defined as 2(L1-L0) where L0 is the value of the log-likelihood function containing only the constant term and L1 is the value of the 
log-likelihood function including all explanatory variables. 
b For Probit models, the R
2 statistic is meaningless. Hence, we report an appropriate measure of goodness of fit, i.e. the Pseudo-R
2. 
*     Significant at 10% level. 
**   Significant at 5% level. 




This paper investigated empirically the determinants of exchange rate regime choice in 15 MENA 
countries. The explanatory variables used included two sets of criteria emanating from the 
optimum currency area and macroeconomic theories. We considered three different measures of 
the dependent variable, choice of exchange regime, in order to avoid potentially misleading 
classification, namely the IMF’s (official) de jure, the LYS and the RR de facto choice of 
exchange rate regimes. 
 
The empirical results obtained from the de jure classification indicate that exchange rate regime 
choices are largely consistent with the predictions of the optimum currency area theory during the 
period under consideration. Countries that are characterized with a high degree of openness as well 
as with a high concentration of trade would tend to opt for fixed exchange rate regimes. However, 
regarding the variable level of economic development, we find that more developed economies 
tend to opt for pegged exchange rate regimes. Among the macroeconomic variables, our results 
show that international reserves play important roles in the regime choice. The results using the de 
facto classifications are very different from those obtained from the de jure specification. 
Regression results using the LYS classification indicate that developed (open) economies 
characterized with high credit expansion (international reserves) are more likely to adopt flexible 
(fixed) exchange rate arrangements. Turning to regressions from the RR classification, again we do 
not find regularities in the results. Nevertheless, as in the previous regressions, we find that high 
international reserves play a major role in determining exchange rate regime choices in the MENA 
countries. Hence, analysis of the determinants of exchange rate regimes practices brings one clear 
conclusion; high international reserves strengthen the tendency toward fixed exchange rate regimes 
among the MENA countries.  
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Appendix A 
 
Table A.1: Predictions concerning the choice of exchange rate regimes 
Structural and macroeconomic characteristic  Preferred regime 
Large size  Flexible 
High economic development  Flexible 
High openness  Fixed 
High concentration of trade with a partner  Fixed 
High inflation differentials  Flexible 
High capital mobility  Flexible 
High level  of international reserves  Fixed 
High ratio of current account to GDP  ? 
High growth   Flexible 
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Table A2: Studies on determinants of Exchange rate Regimes (Likelihood to Float) 
Author  Heller (1978)  Dreyer (1978)  Holden, Holden 
and Suss (1979) 





Sample  86 countries  88 developing 
countries 







1976 1976  1974-75 
(monthly) 
 
1976-78  1978, 1979 and 
1980 
1976-84 1991 




















Logit and Probit 
 
Optimum Currency Area Factors          
Openness  - - - - - - +/- 
Economic development     +    +  
Size of economy  + +   +      + 
Inflation differential  +  +  + + - + 
Capital mobility     -  +  +  
Geographical trade concentration  - - - - -     




        
Growth          
Negative growth          
Inflation          
Moderate to high inflation          
Reserves          
Capital control          
Terms of trade volatility          
Variability in export growth          
External variability * Openness          
Real exchange rate volatility       +  
Product diversification   -     -   
Current account          
External debt          
Growth of domestic credit          
Money shocks     -   - 
Foreign price shocks      +   + 
Source: Adapted from Juhn and Mauro (2002) 
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de Haan (2000) 
 
































Explanatory variables  Logit and Probit  Probit (panel)  Probit (panel)  Probit (panel)  Probit  Ordered Logit 
(panel) 
Probit (panel) 
Optimum Currency Area Factors          
Openness  - +    + -  + 
Economic development  -   +  -  +/-     
Size of economy  + +    +    
Inflation differential          
Capital mobility          
Geographical trade concentration       -     




+/-            
Growth          
Negative growth     +  +    + 
Inflation   -       
Moderate to high inflation          
Reserves          
Capital control          
Terms of trade volatility          
Variability in export growth          
External variability * Openness          
Real exchange rate volatility        +  
Product diversification   -    -   
Current account          
External debt          
Growth of domestic credit          
Money shocks      -     - 
Foreign price shocks      +    + 
Source: Adapted from Juhn and Mauro (2002) 
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and the CIS 
184 countries  125 countries  6 central 
American 
countries 






1990-1999 1990,  1995, 
1999, 2000 
1980-1994 1974-2001  1974-1999  1990-2000 

















Optimum Currency Area Factors            
Openness  - - +/-  - -  -  + 
Economic development  +/- -  +/-  + +    - 
Size of economy  + -  + - +  +  + 
Inflation differential            
Capital mobility     +/-     +   
Geographical trade concentration  + - +/-  + -  -   




          
Growth            
Negative growth  -     +     
Inflation  +           
Moderate to high inflation   +  +/-   +    + 
Reserves  -          
Capital control  - - +/-         
Terms of trade volatility  +  +/-         
Variability in export growth     +/-  +  - +   
External variability * Openness            
Real exchange rate volatility            
Product diversification   -    -     
Current account  + -           
External debt            
Growth of domestic credit       -    - 
Money shocks            
Foreign price shocks            
Source: Adapted from Juhn and Mauro (2002) 
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Table A2: Studies on determinants of Exchange rate Regimes (Likelihood to Float) 
Author Markiewicz 
(2006) 
Sfia (2007)        









1990-2000          




      
Optimum Currency Area Factors              
Openness              
Economic development   +          
Size of economy  + -        
Inflation differential  + +/-        
Capital mobility   -          
Geographical trade concentration   +/-        
International financial integration  + +/-        
Other macroeconomic/external/Structural 
factors 
            
Growth              
Negative growth              
Inflation  -           
Moderate to high inflation              
Reserves  +/- -       
Capital control   +/-        
Terms of trade volatility   +/-        
Variability in export growth              
External variability * Openness              
Real exchange rate volatility              
Product diversification              
Current account              
External debt              
Growth of domestic credit              
Money shocks              
Foreign price shocks              
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Table A.3: Variables, definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition    Source 
• Optimum currency area 
variables 
  
GDP  GDP in U.S. dollars at purchasing 
power parity 
WDI 
Gdpper  GDP per capita in U.S. dollars at PPP  WDI 
Open  Ratio of imports plus exports to GDP  WDI 
Geoc  Exports to the largest trading partner 
as a share of total exports 
DOTS 
Infd  Difference between inflation in the 
country and inflation in the USA.  
WDI 
CapM  Ratio of Gross private capital flows to 
GDP 
WDI 
• Macroeconomic variables    
    
Res  Total reserves in months of imports  WDI 
Cagdp  Ratio of current account balance to 
GDP 
WDI 
Growth  GDP growth (annual %)  WDI 
Credit  ratio of domestic credit to private 
sector to GDP 
IFS 
Notes: WDI = World Bank World Development Indicators. 
DOTS = Direction of Trade Statistics. 




Table A.4: Summary Statistics of Explanatory Variables Used in the Analysis  
Variables Ods.  Mean  Std  Error  Min.  Max. 
GDP 438  7.73e+10  9.07e+10  1.07e+09  5.04e+11 
Gdpper 439  8.98e+08  1.87e+10  0  3.92e+11 
Open  399  0.2255731 0.2373015 0.0211871 1.420069 
Geoc 446  26.61002  10.47089  7  63.2 
Infd 418  4.53459  9.579035  -29.32249  55.74349 
CapM 403  48.94853  482.7734  0 9522 
Res 379  2751.919  27003.63  0.5475839  402384 
Cagdp 410  2858.759  29910.32  -240.4958  445980 
Growth 388  3.819214  5.614056  -20.61553  33.99047 
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Table A.5 : Pairwise correlations matrix, 15 MENA countries, 1977-2007 
 IMF  LYS  RR  Gdp  Gdpper  Open  Geoc  Infd  CapM  Res  Cagdp  Growth  Credit 
I M F   1 . 0 0 0 0               
LYS  0.4338  1.0000             
RR  0.0270  0.1035  1.0000            
Gdp  0.3827  0.1288  0.2307  1.0000           
Gdpper  -0.0338  -0.0502  0.0385  -0.0062  1.0000          
Open  -0.3318  -0.2295  0.1243  -0.2732  0.0298  1.0000         
Geoc  -0.1098 -0.0730 0.3245  -0.0010 0.0516  0.0154  1.0000             
Infd  0.0703 0.1252 0.0638 0.0945 -0.0207 -0.3629  0.0497 1.0000          
CapM  0.0851 -0.1416  0.1825 0.0005 -0.0050 0.2095 0.0196 -0.0440  1.0000        
Res  0.0099  -0.1540 0.0035  -0.0441 -0.0051 -0.0531 0.0599  -0.0280 -0.0197 1.0000       
Cagdp  -0.0634 -0.0168 0.0296  0.1359  -0.0046 0.0210 0.0380 -0.0474  0.0142 0.5840 1.0000    
Growth 0.0622  -0.0023 -0.1879 -0.0184 -0.0869 -0.1566 0.0100  0.0081  0.0740  0.0136  -0.0138 1.0000   
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